Refusing to Stay Silent: Petition e‑2835 and Canada's Reckoning with Foreign Interference
By Mimi Lee
In September 2020, I took a step I never imagined I would take: with an MP's sponsorship, I initiated House of Commons Petition e‑2835, an official federal e‑petition calling on the Government of Canada to strengthen its response to foreign interference. At the time, I was just a Canadian deeply concerned about what I was seeing — intimidation of diaspora communities, reports of covert influence, and a growing sense that our democratic institutions were not equipped to respond.
According to the House of Commons petitions system, any Canadian can raise an issue directly to Parliament through an e‑petition, as long as an MP agrees to sponsor it. Once presented in the House (with at least 500 signatures online or 25 in ink), the government must table a written response within 45 days. I used this mechanism because it was one of the few direct democratic tools available to ordinary people like me, and unlike petitions hosted on private third‑party platforms, a House of Commons e‑petition is guaranteed to be formally received, reviewed, and responded to within Parliament.
Petition e‑2835 did not disappear quietly. It arrived at a moment when concerns about foreign interference — particularly activities linked to the People's Republic of China, Russia, and other state actors — were gaining national attention. The petition's themes echoed widely: the need for transparency, stronger laws, better protection for diaspora communities, and a more coordinated federal response.
Two months later, in November 2020, the same MP who sponsored Petition e‑2835 introduced Motion M‑55, a parliamentary motion that reaffirmed the seriousness of foreign interference and called for a stronger governmental response. M‑55 was introduced on November 26, 2020, one day before e‑2835 was formally presented in the House on November 27, 2020. While motions do not cite petitions as formal sources, the fact that the sponsoring MP was advancing both efforts within the same week shows that the concerns raised in the petition were aligned with — and helped reinforce — the growing push inside Parliament to address foreign interference. This period marked a turning point, not because the government was eager to act, but because public pressure, media scrutiny, and growing concern from diaspora communities made it increasingly difficult for Ottawa to ignore the issue.
Coordinating a House of Commons e‑petition is not instantaneous. It often takes several weeks — sometimes months — to work with an MP, refine the wording, and ensure the petition meets the platform's procedural requirements. Knowing this, the fact that Motion M‑55 was introduced one day before Petition e‑2835 was formally posted is telling. It suggests the sponsoring MP wanted to ensure the issue was being raised on multiple fronts at the same time, amplifying public attention and signalling that foreign interference was becoming too significant to ignore.
By late 2020, the federal government had to begin referencing multi‑year strategies related to democratic protection — such as cyber‑threat assessments, election‑security protocols, and international cooperation frameworks — but these steps were limited, reactive, and largely rhetorical (Timeline of Measures to Combat Foreign Interference). They reflected mounting pressure from citizens and civil society, pressure that Parliament itself was beginning to acknowledge. Subsequent developments — including the slow and incomplete implementation of Bill C‑70 — further demonstrated how consistently government action fell short of the urgency and scale of the threat.
Motion M‑55 fit into this growing national awareness, but it also did more than simply "signal concern." It helped reinforce foreign interference as a systemic threat that Parliament could no longer treat as isolated incidents. While motions do not create laws, M‑55 contributed to the political groundwork that eventually led to later actions — including committee studies, the push for a public inquiry, and ultimately the development of Bill C‑70 in 2024. Petition e‑2835 was part of that early shift, one of the first public interventions that helped elevate foreign interference from a niche concern to a sustained parliamentary priority.
By 2023, the issue had escalated dramatically. Media reporting, intelligence briefings, and testimony from diaspora communities brought foreign interference into the national spotlight. In March 2023, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC) passed another motion calling for a national public inquiry into allegations of foreign interference in Canada's democratic system. Although a committee motion cannot itself authorize a public inquiry under the Inquiries Act, PROC's motion was far from symbolic. It added institutional pressure, amplified public concern, and helped push the government toward establishing the Foreign Interference Commission in 2023.
The themes raised in Petition e‑2835 were now being repeated at the highest levels of Parliament: transparency, accountability, protection of diaspora communities, and safeguarding democratic institutions.
On September 7, 2023, the Government of Canada formally established the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, commonly known as the Foreign Interference Commission. Justice Marie‑Josée Hogue was appointed Commissioner.
The Commission's work unfolded in two phases. Phase 1 (2023–2024) examined interference by China, Russia, and other foreign actors in the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, with public hearings in March and April 2024. Phase 2 (2024) assessed the capacity of federal institutions — including CSIS, the RCMP, Global Affairs Canada, Elections Canada, and the Privy Council Office — to detect, deter, and counter foreign interference. This phase concluded in October 2024.
The Commission's Final Report was released on January 28, 2025, a few days ahead of its January 31 mandated deadline. Unfortunately, the report was not thorough and did not meaningfully advance Canada's ability to counter foreign interference. The country still lacked clear leadership, timelines, and implementation of key tools such as a foreign influence registry.
Meanwhile, MPs in Parliament continued to move on the legislative front. In June 2024, the federal government passed Bill C‑70, a major national security package that included new tools to address foreign interference. C‑70 strengthened CSIS authorities, created new offences related to deceptive or covert foreign influence, and laid the groundwork for a foreign influence transparency registry.
Many observers saw C‑70 as the legislative culmination of years of public pressure, committee studies, intelligence warnings, and civic engagement — including early actions like Petition e‑2835.
But the story does not end there.
Despite the passage of C‑70, Canada's problem is not solved. Civil society organizations, legal experts, and diaspora advocates have repeatedly warned that implementation has stalled. The foreign influence registry — one of the most anticipated tools — cannot function until the government designates leadership, allocates resources, and sets timelines. As of the time of writing, these steps had not been completed.
A February 2025 article in The Hill Times, titled "Action required to make up for time lost on foreign interference", argued that Canada has lost years to delays and that the Foreign Interference Commission's final report did not meaningfully advance solutions. The authors stressed that the time for analysis is over and that Canada must now act.
This is where the next phase of civic engagement begins.
Canada can move forward by demanding clear timelines from MPs on key reforms; launching a new Parliamentary study (PROC or SECU) to examine delays and transnational repression; and urging the Minister of Public Safety to issue an immediate Ministerial Directive requiring public reporting, the development of diaspora safety protocols, and the closure of foreign police stations. Canada could also establish a Foreign Interference Ombudsperson; create a public registry of all foreign policing agreements; adopt a National Diaspora Safety Strategy; form a multi‑party caucus to depoliticize the issue; and implement a national hotline so diaspora communities can safely report intimidation, harassment, and foreign interference attempts. There are still lots to do.
When I launched Petition e‑2835, I never imagined it would become part of a national conversation. I was just one person trying to protect my community and my country. That petition did not fix the system — but it helped spark a chain of events that pushed Canada to take foreign interference seriously. And now, just like in 2020, the next steps will require the same thing that started it all: ordinary people refusing to stay silent.